Users increasingly rely on Internet of Things (IoT) apps to manage their digital lives through the overwhelming diversity of IoT services and devices. Are the IoT app platforms doing enough to protect the privacy and security of their users? By securing IoT apps, how can we help users reclaim control over their data?
T he world of the Internet of Things (IoT) is fasci nating, but who is in charge? Meet Iona, whose story of ups and downs in the IoT world will help us illustrate how the technical aspects of securing IoT apps can have reallife impact on nontechnical users.
Users Lack Control Over Their Digital Lives
Scenarios like this illustrate that users often lack suf ficient control over their digital lives. The heterog enous nature of the IoT implies that although the services and devices might be connected by a net work, robust application support is needed so that the interacting services and devices can be controlled by the users. Rather than reinventing new protocols and standards for the IoT, the Web of Things 1 reuses wellknown web standards to enable a smooth appli cation layer for IoT applications. Billions of devices, from printers to smart TVs, already routinely run web Take 1: Help! O n her way home, Iona parks her car at a shopping mall, takes a picture of the season' s first snow in a nearby park, and heads to the mall for some shopping. However, when her shopping is done, she has a hard time remembering where she parked her car. She realizes she accidentally deleted the first-snow picture as she was fiddling with her phone. To make things worse, she also realizes that she forgot to turn on the thermostat at home, which is unfortunate given the chilly weather. All of this is especially frustrating because her phone is an Internet-connected smartphone; her car is a connected car, with rich Internet and infotainment features; and her thermostat is connected to the Internet through the vendor' s portal. Connectivity alone is clearly not enough to manage Iona' s digital life through the overwhelming diversity of IoT services and devices.
servers and clients, forming a heterogeneous Web of Things. In the automotive domain, HTML5/Java Script standards enable web connectivity through invehicle infotainment systems and vehicle data access protocols. 2 Just as the Internet provides networklevel con nectivity and the web provides applicationlevel con nectivity, IoT apps take the main stage for managing users' digital lives. For our general purposes, an IoT app is a piece of software that runs on behalf of the user to implement a functionality in the IoT setting.
IoT App Platforms Enable Control…
IoT apps help users manage their digital lives by con necting Internetconnected components ranging from cyberphysical things (such as smart homes, cars, and fit ness armbands) to online services (such as Google and Dropbox) and social networks (such as Facebook and Twitter). We focus on two prime examples of IoT app platforms: userautomation apps and invehicle apps. These two independently interesting scenarios help us illustrate that although some problems and solutions are common to IoT apps, others are more specific (such as URLbased threats for webdriven IoT apps versus roadsafety risks for invehicle apps).
Popular userautomation platforms include If This Then That (IFTTT), Zapier, and Microsoft Flow. IFTTT, the most popular of these platforms, sup ports more than 550 Internetconnected components and services, 11 million users and 54 million apps, and one billion apps run per month. 3 At the core of these platforms are reactive apps, which include trig gers, actions, and filter code for customization. Trig gers and actions may involve ingredients, enabling app makers to pass parameters to triggers and actions. The filter part is invoked after a trigger has been fired and before an action is dispatched. Filters allow apps to be highly customizable: they are essentially code snippets, often in JavaScript, with application pro gramming interfaces (APIs) pertaining to the services used. Users can make apps and publish them for other users as platforms capitalize on the model of enduser programming. Figure 1 depicts the architecture of a userautomation app, illustrating how triggers act as information sources and actions act as informa tion sinks.
Cars are now equipped with socalled infotainment systems, the abilities of which have developed over the years from basic radio and navigation units to power ful Internetconnected devices comparable to tablets and smartphones. Recently, several car manufactur ers, including Volvo, Renault, Nissan, and Mitsubi shi, announced the upcoming possibility of installing thirdparty apps onto these infotainment systems. These manufacturers leverage a special version of Android for use in cars, called Android Automotive, 4 an open platform where third parties can publish their apps. Similar to userautomation apps, invehicle car apps offer a variety of features. At the same time, these apps have access to sensitive information, such as car location, and have some capability of affecting the vehicle while it is on the road. ...And Weaponize the Attacker...
Unfortunately, the power of IoT apps can be abused by attackers. Although app stores boost innovation and market potential (as seen in successful examples like Google Play), they also create possibilities for attacks by malicious developers. In the area of web and mobile security, the recent breach of personal data of more than 50 million Facebook users by Cambridge Analytica's malicious Facebook app 5 provides alarming evidence that threats from malicious thirdparty apps are real. IoT apps, such as those on the IFTTT platform, access sensitive user location, fitness information, content of private files, or private feed from social networks. This sensitive information can be compromised by insecure or buggy apps. Figure 2 shows a user's view of a thirdparty user automation app, consisting of trigger "Any new photo" (provided by iOS Photos), action "Upload file from URL" (provided by Google Drive), and execution of filter code transparently to the user. The desired expec tation is that users explicitly allow the app to access their photos but only to be used on their Google Drive. However, the user cannot inspect the filter code or the ingredient parameters and is not told whether filter code is present at all. Moreover, modifications in the filter code or ingredients can be performed at any time by the app maker, with no user notification. As a result, a thirdparty maker is granted the opportunity to make and publish malicious apps for all users with the goal of crafting filter code and ingredient parameters to exfil trate users' photos.
As previously mentioned, several car manufactur ers have announced the upcoming possibility of install ing thirdparty apps onto their infotainment systems.
Because these apps have access to sensitive resources, such as the car's location, they can also be of interest to malicious app makers. A series of wellpublicized attacks 6 in the domain of Internetconnected cars exploited the infotainment software in Jeeps to send commands to the dashboard functions, steering, brakes, and transmission system, gaining full control of the car from a remote laptop. In 2015, Chrysler issued a formal recall for 1.4 million vehicles affected by the vulnerabil ity. This highlights the need to secure IoT apps against thirdparty makers.
The exposure of safety and securitycritical infor mation to the web via IoT platforms increases the attack surface, enabling different kinds of attackers to take advantage of potential vulnerabilities at different components of the IoT app ecosystem: the environ ment, physical devices, services, communication net work, cloudbased IoT platform, and user interfaces. Table 1 (first column) provides an overview of the attackers that arise in the context of webconnected IoT apps.
In addition to thirdparty makers, a malicious user or service may have access to the source and sink services of an IoT app, for instance, by being part of the user's audience of a social media post or simply by being able to send emails to the user. A benign IoT app that connects such services may enable sensitive information disclosure that a user did not consider as possible at the time of app's installation, for example, by enlarging the audience of a social media post or by receiving malware via email attachments. Moreover, the unique ability of IoT apps to affect the shared (physical and/or logi cal) environment, such as the room temperature or the cloud storage, enables unintended crossapp interactions between IoT apps that are installed by the same user. Finally, because the interaction between services is materialized on the cloudbased IoT platform via the Internet, IoT apps inherit clas sical weaknesses with respect to the cloud attacker and malicious platforms.
...In the Face of Current Security Mechanisms
IoT platforms incorporate varying forms of access control and authorization to control the access to sen sitive APIs. For instance, the IFTTT platform requires user authentication and authorization on partner ser vices, such as iOS Photos and Google Drive to poll a trigger's service for new data or to push data to a ser vice in response to the execution of an action. This is achieved through the OAuth 2.0 authorization proto col, which, upon app installation, redirects the user to the authentication page hosted by the service provider. An access token is then generated and used by the plat form for future executions of any apps that use such services. For the app in Figure 2 , the user gives the app access to his/her iOS Photos and Google Drive. Such permissions are coarsegrained, giving access to more user information than what the app requires to perform its functionality. Furthermore, the filter code is run in an isolated environment (called the sandbox) with a short timeout. By design, the sandbox allows access only to APIs pertaining to the services used by the app; otherwise, it provides no input-output or blocking capabilities.
Unfortunately, malicious app makers can bypass the access control mechanism of the sandbox by crafting filter code. Platforms often leverage URLs as "universal glue" for connecting different services. iOS Photos and Google Drive, for example, pro vide URLbased APIs connected to app actions for uploading content. For the photobackup app in Fig  ure 2 , IFTTT uploads a new photo to its server, cre ates a publicly accessible random URL, and passes it to Google Drive. URLs are also used by apps in other contexts, such as including custom images like logos in email notifications.
Bastys et al. 7 demonstrate two classes of URL based attacks for stealth exfiltration of private information by apps: URLupload attacks and URL markup attacks. Under both attacks, a malicious maker may craft a URL by encoding the private information as a parameter part of a URL linking to a server under the attacker's control, such as https:// attacker.com?secret.
In a URLupload attack, the attacker exploits the capability of uploads via links. In a scenario in Fig  ure 2 , IFTTT stores any new photo on its server and passes it to Google Drive using an intermediate URL.
Thus, the attacker can pass the intermediate URL to In a URL markup attack, the attacker creates HTML markup with a link to an invisible image with the crafted URL embedding the secret, such as the user's location map. The markup can be part of a post on a social net work or the body of an email message. The leak is then executed by a web request upon processing the markup by a web browser or an email reader.
Bastys et al. 7 show that the other common user automation platforms, Zapier and Microsoft Flow, are both vulnerable to URLbased attacks. URLbased exfiltration attacks are particularly powerful because of their stealth nature. They performed a measurement study on a data set of about 300,000 IFTTT apps from more than 400 services and found that 30% of the apps were susceptible to stealthy privacy attacks by malicious app makers.
Invehicle apps are also susceptible to attacks by malicious makers. 8 The Android Automotive secu rity architecture inherits much from the regular Android permission model. 9 This model forces the apps to request permissions before using the sys tem resources. Sensitive resources, such as camera and GPS, require the user to explicitly grant them access before the app can use them. Other resources, such as using the Internet or nearfield communica tion (better known as NFC), can be granted during installation. From a user's perspective, the security implications of these permissions are often hard to understand.
SoundBlast, a representative of disturbance attacks, demonstrates how a malicious app can shock the driver by excessive sound volume, for example, upon reaching high speed. Malicious apps can also trig ger availability attacks, such as ForkBomb and Intent Storm, which render the infotainment system unus able until it is rebooted. Similar to userautomation apps, malicious invehicle apps can exfiltrate sensitive information, such as vehicle location and invehicle voice sound.
Other invehicle privacy threats obtain information from onboard sensors, such as speed, temperature, and engine r/min. Although accessing the current speed requires a permission, accessing the current r/min or gear requires no permission in Android Automotive. The attacker can thus easily approximate speed based on the r/min and gear data. 8 Surbatovich et al. 10 point out that even benign IoT apps may cause security and privacy risks that a user did not anticipate at the time of the app's installation. For instance, the userautomation app "If I take a new photo, then upload on Flickr as public photo" could leak sensitive or embarrassing information if the user took a picture of a check to send to his/her landlord or a picture of a romantic partner. Furthermore, the interaction of userautomation apps installed by the same user can enable additional risks due to crossapp interactions. For instance, a user may install these two apps for different purposes: "If I leave my work location, turn on the thermostat at home" and "If the room temperature exceeds a threshold, open the win dows." Although the user's intention is to use these apps for separate purposes, their interaction may open the window while the user is away, thus clear ing the way for burglary. Similarly, a smokealarm app ("If smoke is detected, activate the alarm and open the water valve to activate the fire sprinklers") may interact with a waterleakdetector app ("If a water leak is detected, shut off the water valve") and shut off the water valve when a fire is detected, a scenario studied by Celik et al. 11 Moreover, because billions of users confide their digital lives to a cloudbased IoT platform with pow erful access to their services, both the cloud and the services become targets of cloudbased attacks. A compromised service allows an attacker to steal authorization tokens and perform sensitive actions on other user services. Similarly, a compromised IoT platform allows the attacker to affect billions of platform users. Fernandes et al. 12 show that over privilege is a significant shortcoming of permission models in userautomation apps, despite the efforts of userautomation platforms to constrain danger ous privileges.
The exposure of permissions that are never used by IoT apps further increases the risk for malicious uses. Recently, different IoT platforms have begun to allow for interactions of IoT apps across IoT platforms, with the goal of overcoming the drawbacks of a given plat form. For instance, because IFTTT does not allow multiple triggers in apps, platforms, such as apilio. io, have emerged and can be used to mash up differ ent IFTTT apps to implement complex trigger logic. Furthermore, different platforms, such as IFTTT and Stringify, allow their respective apps to interact with each other. From a security perspective, such develop ments increase the attack surface, opening up opportu nities for new breaches. Finally, as apps increasingly rely on AIpowered components, the ability to ana lyze and address adversarial threats for machine learn ing 13 is becoming increasingly important.
Iona's life gets harder than ever.
How can we secure IoT apps and platforms in the face of these threats?
Giving Control Back to the Users
The root cause of security and privacy violations in malicious and buggy IoT apps is the flow of informa tion from sensitive sources to insensitive sinks. The problem is further exacerbated by the exposure of coarsegrained permissions by platforms and services to IoT apps, thereby increasing the risks whenever these platforms or services get compromised. More over, trusting the platforms and services with sensitive user data imposes additional risks whenever these data are used improperly. In the face of current threats and vulnerabilities, we discuss immediate and exploratory countermeasures that either 1) break the insecure flows through tighter access controls and decentraliza tion or 2) track the information flows via information flow control.
Immediate Countermeasures
The granularity of access control in IoT apps varies from allornothing to coarsegrained permissions. The attacks described underscore the need for finegrained access con trol. This can be achieved by defining a security architec ture that enables service providers to expose finergrained APIs to IoT platforms, possibly with information about the sensitivity level of the data. IoT platforms, on the other hand, can improve their security mechanisms to enforce finegrained access control, for example, by providing safe output encoding through APIs such that the only way to include links or image markup on a sink is through API constructors generated by the platform.
Users are entitled to have the final say on defining security policies over their data. At the same time, a secu rity mechanism is practical only if it does not burden users with settings, notifications, or popups. Luckily, in many cases, finegrained permissions can be automati cally derived from the context. Thus, the overall workflow can be accommodated with minimal user effort. Service providers already need to register on the IoT platform as partner services. Hence, permissions can either be derived from the services used in a given app or checked by the users in a way similar to dynamic permissions in Android apps. Therefore, the app shown in Figure 2 will not necessarily need additional user interaction. The trig ger ("Any new photo") can be automatically classified as sensitive. On the other hand, triggers like "Astronaut enters space" can be automatically classified as public.
Exploratory Countermeasures
IoT platforms are centralized entities that have privi leged access to sensitive data and the devices of billions of users. As such, both platforms and services become an attractive target for attackers. If they are compromised, attackers can learn sensitive user data and arbitrarily manipulate user data and devices. Decentralization allows us to reduce the trust placed on the IoT platforms by full mediation of the communication between service providers via finegrained authorization tokens, such as perapp tokens, and trusted client apps, such as mobile apps. Fernandes et al. 12 proposed a decentralized archi tecture that enforces the integrity of an app's actions with negligible performance overhead. However, protecting the privacy of user data in the context of a malicious plat form remains an open problem. One solution is to build a decentralized peertopeer system between all service providers that are involved in a userautomation app and to implement and execute the app's functionality on one of the trigger's or action's services. By eliminat ing the cloud platform, this solution improves security and privacy at the expense of more complex services and business relationships among service providers. Another solution is to leverage the recent advances in homo morphic encryption and use the IoT platform only as a means of computing over encrypted data. For example, computing the proximity to a given location without revealing the actual user location requires a simple com parison over encrypted data, which is within reach for homomorphic encryption techniques.
A promising approach for protecting against third party apps is tracking the flow of information from sen sitive sources to insensitive sinks. Fernandes et al. 14 proposed a framework in which information flow con trol is combined with sandboxing. Bastys et al. 7 lev eraged stateoftheart informationflow trackers to control flows in JavaScriptdriven userautomation Take 3: Digital Life Hijacked O n her way home, Iona parks her car at a shopping mall, takes a picture of the season's first snow in a nearby park, and heads to the mall for some shopping. As she receives an email with the map where her car is parked, the map is also sent to an attacker, unbeknownst to her. As her picture is backed up on Google Drive, the picture is stealthily uploaded on the attacker's server as well. The attacker sets the thermostat on the highest temperature, causing the windows to open automatically and thus clearing a way for burglars to enter. 
Other Countermeasures
Securing userautomation apps goes beyond the purely technical solutions that we have discussed so far. A userautomation app may simply describe a desirable functionality in the app's description text, such as "Auto matically back up your new iOS Photos to Google Drive," while implementing a different functionality, such as "Unlock the door. " As a result, a user may be tricked into installing an app the does not meet his/her original inten tions. Similarly, even benign apps can yield unintended consequences whenever they are used in contexts that the user did not anticipate at the time of app's installa tion. Hence, it is important to raise the user awareness on the security and privacy risks that come with the apps. Recent techniques that use natural language processing to match the app's textual descriptions with the actual API are a promising approach in this direction; however, the contextdependent nature of userautomation apps ultimately requires the end user to evaluate the risks. Figure 3 contrasts the secure app store architecture with the traditional one. The latter allows apps to act on a user's behalf, implying risks, such as leaking user location to third parties. The former can instead analyze an app for insecure information flows, detecting such insecurities as tracking by thirdparty components. This can be achieved through robust permissions, API control, and informationflow control. A secure version of the app can be cleared for ship ment to vehicles, enabling secure locationbased services, such as finding nearby points of interest without leaking the driver's location to unauthorized parties. At last, there is peace and quiet in Iona's life.
In-Vehicle Apps

The Road Ahead
IoT security is hard, in general, because of the combina tion of heterogeneity, connectivity, limited resources, and device longevity. 15 The area of IoT apps brings additional challenges. Although users entrust their sen sitive information to IoT apps, the IoT platforms thrive on thirdparty code. In the area of invehicle apps, safety challenges need to be addressed, as thirdparty apps are trusted resources and in control of the infotainment units. Although the latest developments boost innovation and business potential, they also open up the possibil ity of largescale, highimpact attacks by malicious app makers. The Cambridge Analytica privacy breach in the area of web and mobile security has demonstrated that threats by malicious thirdparty apps are real. Similar to the Facebook app for personality testing from Cambridge Analytica, users might be tempted to install, for example, an IoT app for carbon dioxide emission detection, which can maliciously exfiltrate user location information. This type of exfiltration can be extended to attack the service itself. For example, Uber's IFTTT APIs expose not only pickup and dropoff locations for each trip but also the driver's name, phone number, and photo as well as the car's license plate number. This opens up opportunities for stealthy profiling of Uber as a company, by building a detailed database of its drivers and vehicle fleet. Scenarios like this call for a principled approach to security, safety, and privacy of IoT apps. W e identify the following key challenges for securing IoT apps. Based on the limited cur rent technology, there is a high demand to develop the following concepts and mechanisms.
■ Fine-grained access control can regulate safe and secure use of sensitive resources. This needs to include fully 
